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EMINENT DOMAIN AFTER KELO V. NEW LONDON: IS
CHANGE IMMINENT?
By
Dennis D. DiMarzio*, Glenna Summer**, and Lonnie
Jackson***

I. INTRODUCTION

The United States Supreme Court has historically
played the critical role of hearing and deciding cases that
ultimately define our society as one oflaw. Many of the
Court's decisions have been handed down with little fanfare,
and any national publicity and debate faded soon thereafter.
Sometimes, however, the Court renders a landmark decision
which involves such a fundamental right and has such
immediate and long term implications that a firestorm of
national publicity and debate continue long after the decision
date. One June 23, 2005, the Supreme Court decided such a
case, Kelo v. New London, 1 an eminent domain decision, and
the firestorm of publicity and debate continues. In Keto, 2 the
Court dramatically expanded the eminent domain power of
government to take private property for "public purposes"
rather than "public use." The Court reasoned that a
Connecticut city could constitutionally take private property in
the name of economic development by a private developer.
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The purpose of this paper shall be to analyze the controversial
case of Kelo v. New London 3 and to evaluate its clear
implications. A brief historical overview of the law of eminent
domain will be presented in order to gain a proper perspective
of the Keto decision. The Keto decision will then be discussed.
Finally, the implications ofthis decision will be evaluated.

subsequent settlers. 11 The Court found it repugnant to seize the
property of one citizen to give it to another citizen. 12 In the
1798 Calder v. Bull decision, 13 the Court again refused to
support a decision that " ... takes property from A and gives it to

B ."I4

B. Clear Public Use Approach
II. BRIEF HISTORICAL OVERVIEW OF THE LAW OF
EMINENT DOMAIN
The "Takings Clause" located in the Constitution's
Fifth Amendment reads: " .. .Nor shall private property be
4
taken for public use, without just compensation. " That Clause
has been applied to the States through the Court's
incorporation of the Takings Clause into the Fourteenth
Amendment's Due Process Clause. 5 This Constitutional basis
for the Government's eminent domain power is fundamentally
important. But even before these Constitutional provisions
were penned, the Founders embraced property ownership as a
fundamental right of liberty. Philosopher John Locke believed
that the right to property was a natural right to man. That
" .. . governments were formed to protect the natural rights of
man ... " 6 was "most influential"7 for the Founders. James
Madison Thomas Jefferson and John Adams embraced the
Lockean 'view of property 8 and by the late eighteenth century
9
the "Lockean" view was widely accepted in America.
A. Early Decisions Protecting Private Property
Two Supreme Court decisions highlight the Court's
property interests.
primary concern with protecting
1
Vanhorne's Lessee v. Dorrance, declared in 1795 a
Pennsylvania statute unconstitutional that would have resolved
a land dispute by taking property away from certain
Pennsylvania citizens and transferring it to a group of

Government, however, could take property and transfer
use such as a military facility, a
title to itself for some
public road or a park. 1 Furthermore, that public use
interpretation was stretched to include condemnations and
transfers of title from one private party to another when the
subsequent use would be available to the public at large.
Common examples include common carriers like railroads, a
public utility, or a stadium. 16
C. Public Benefit or Public Purpose Approach

Two landmark Supreme Court decisions dramatically
expanded the meaning of "public use" to include "public
benefit" or "public furpose" in eminent domain takings. In
Berman v. Parker, 1 congress identified a blighted
neighborhood in Washington D.C. and determined that it had
become "injurious to the public health, safety, morals, and
welfare" and that it was necessary to "eliminate all such
injurious conditions by employing all means necessary and
appropriate for the purpose," including eminent domain. 18 The
case involved the wholesale taking of hundreds of urban
dwellings, razing them, and then turning their sites over to
private developers who would then build new improvements
for their private, profit-making purposes. Mr. Berman objected
to the taking of hi non-blighted department store. However,
the Court allowed the taking of the neighborhood as a whole.
In Hawaii housing Authority v. Midkiff, 19 the Court approved
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an eminent domain taking of real property from lessors and
transferring it to lessees on the Hawaiian island of Oahu, where
it was said there was oligopolistic state of freehold title that
was "skewing the State's residential fee simple market,
inflating land prices, and injuring the public tranquility and
welfare."20 The Court had expanded its view of"public use."

Eminent domain must be limited to enterprises that generate
public benefit, and whose very existence depends on land that
can only be provided by the central government. 24 Second, the
Court stated its "Public Accountability Test." When the
private entity remains accountable to the public in its use of the
property, a public use exists.25 Finally, the Court identified its
"Public Concern Test." A public use exists when the selection
of the condemned land for a private interest is based on
immediate public concerns and facts of independent public
significance?6 The Decision was in sharp contrast to the
expanded Po letown construction of "public use" for an eminent
domain taking. Instead, The Hathcock Court required that in
order to justify an eminent domain taking of property near the
new Metropolitan Airport runway, it would apply the three
tests and require that at least one of them be satisfied.

In 1981, the Michigan Supreme Court allowed the City
of Detroit to accomplish a pervasive eminent domain taking in
the name of"economic development." In Poletown
21
Neighborhood Council v. City ofDetroit, the City of Detroit
sought to prevent a pending unemployment crisis and to spur
"economic development." The City was allowed to condemn
and take the entire residential community of Poletown and then
sell the property at a dramatically reduced price to General
Motors. The purpose of the sale was to guarantee that General
Motors would not close operations in the area. the taking
included churches, school, hospitals, and displaced over thirty22
four hundred residents.
In 2004, however, the Michigan Supreme court
effectively overturned its Poletown decision in the case of
County of Wayne v. Hathcock. 23 The County of Wayne started
a project for the development of business and technology near
its new Metropolitan Airport terminal and jet runway. The
county commenced a series of condemnation proceedings to
acquire the property for developers. The County claimed not
blight removal but rather improvement of the local economy
with projected new jobs and substantial additional tax revenue.

The Michigan Supreme Court rejected the
condemnation claims and thus narrowed its interpretation of
"public use." The Court established three tests, and of which
would be sufficient to justify a condemnation under Michigan
law. First, the Court announced a "Public Necessity Test."

III. KELO V NEW LONDON

Should there be a broad definition of"public use" as
opposed to applying tests and imposing greater scrutiny for an
eminent domain taking of private property? The expanding
and diverse case law involving eminent domain proceedings
clearly showed that lower courts were struggling with this
question. In Keto v. New London,27 the Supreme Court granted
certiorari and seized the opportunity to answer this question in
an eminent domain case from Connecticut. The Court would
offer its modern day definition for an appropriate taking under
the Fifth Amendment's Takings Clause applied to the States
through the Fourteenth Amendment. The City ofNew London,
Connecticut approved an integrated development plan designed
to revitalize its ailing economy. Through its development
agent, the City purchased most of the property targeted for the
project from willing sellers, but initiated condemnation
proceedings against certain unwilling sellers. Invoking a state
statute that specifically authorized eminent domain to promote
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economic development, and arguing that Supreme Court
precedent and its expanded definition of "public use" should
justify its condemnation claims, the City ofNew London
prevailed before the Supreme Court of Connecticut. 28

Justice Stevens delivered the opinion of a divided court.
In a five to four decision, Justices Souter, Ginsburg, Breyer and
Kennedy joined Justice Stevens. Justice Kennedy filed a
concurring opinion. Justice Kennedy suggested that in certain
cases a heightened standard of review should be used. In
" ... cases in which the transfers are so suspicious, or the
procedures employed so prone to abuse, or the benefits are so
trivial or implausible, that courts should presume an
impermissible private purpose."34 He emphasized that Keto
was not such a case. The Chief Justice, Justice Scalia, Justice
O'Connor, and Justice Thomas dissented. Justice O'Connor
and Justice Thomas wrote separate dissenting opinions. Those
dissenting opinions serve as a foundation of the next section of
this paper, where the implications of the Kelo decision will be
evaluated.

The City ofNew London intended the development
plan to capitalize on the Pfizer Company building a major
facility. It was expected to create jobs, increase tax and other
revenues, and to revitalize an economically distressed city,
including its downtown and waterfront areas. Suzette Kelo had
lived in the area since 1997 and had made extensive
improvements to her water view home. In all, there were nine
parties inc1uding Ms. Kelo who contested the condemnation
c1aims. While the Connecticut Supreme Court ultimately
approved the taking, the dissenting justices would have
imposed a "heightened" standard of judicial review for takings
justified by economic development. They would have found
the takings unconstitutional because the City failed to establish
by "c1ear and convincing evidence" that the economic benefits
of the plan would have been realized."29
In affirming the Kelo 30case, the Supreme Court not only
embraced the broad definition of "public use" to inc1ude public
purpose, but it also clearly rejected any "heightened" review
for takings justified by economic development. Writing for the
majority, Justice Stevens noted that a rational basis review was
appropriate because, "there is ... no principled way of
distinguishing economic development from other public
purposes we have recognized." 31 Furthermore, he noted that
the Court has a "longstanding policy of deference to legislative
judgments in the field." 32 He also emphasized" ... that nothing
in our opinion precludes any state from placing further
restrictions on its exercise of the takings power. ,,33

IV. IMPLICATIONS OF KELO
A. The Kelo Dissenting Opinions

There is no better place to begin the evaluation of the
implications of the Kelo decision than to examine the separate
dissenting opinions written in the case by Justice O'Connor
and Justice Thomas. Justice O'Connor expressed her concerns
about the decision in two remarkable observations:
The spector of condemnation hangs over all property.
Nothing is to prevent the State from replacing any
Motel 6 with a Ritz-Carlton, any home with a shopping
mall, or any farm with a factory .. .. The beneficiaries
are likely to be those citizens with disproportionate
influence and power in the political process including
large corporations and development firms. 35
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Justice O'Connor clearly felt the Court too broadly defined
"public use" under the Takings Clause and that it abdicated its
responsibility to properly enforce the Constitution when it
suggested that the States could choose appropriate limits on
economic development takings.

that the newly composed Court would agree to hear a new case
testing the Takings Clause or that they would do anything other
than affirm the Kelo decision.

Justice Thomas warned that the Kelo decision was "far
reaching, and dangerous. " 36 He traced the law of government
takings and reasoned that the Court had gone too far in
defining "public use". 37 Furthermore, he referred to earlier
urban renewal projects that some described as 'Negro
removal. ' He observed that a disproportionate percentage of
lower income, elderly, and non-white people would likely be
impacted by the Court's decision. 38
Justice Thomas argued that "There is no
justification ... for affording almost insurmountable deference to
legislative conclusions that a use serves a public purpose." 39
He stated that the Court has lon§ had an " ... overriding respect
for the sanctity of the home ... " 0 and that the Court " ... would
not defer to a legislature's determination of the various
circumstances that establish ... when a search of a home would
be reasonable."41 Yet, the Court cannot" ... second-guess ...
whether the government may take the infinitely more intrusive
step of tearing down ... homes."42 He poignantly observes,
"Though citizens are safe from the government in their homes,
the homes themselves are not."43
No less than two Supreme Court Justices then warned
of the pending problems resulting from the Kelo decision.
They were joined in their dissents by two additional justices,
Chief Justice Rhenquist and Justice Scalia. Since the Kelo
decision, Justice Roberts and Justice Alito have replaced Chief
Justice Rhenquist and Justice O'Connor, but ifleft the Kelo
majority intact. That being true, it is therefore highly unlikely

While the ultimate Kelo decision and the strong
dissenting opinions that were a part of it will long be
remembered, perhaps the most significant aspect of the case
was justice Stevens' statements in the opinion that the Court
would defer to legislative judgments in the field and " .. . that
nothing in our opinion precludes any state from placing further
44
restrictions on its exercise of the takings power." These are
telling statements that leave the door wide open for state
legislatures and state supreme courts to tailor their own state
takings power. When the Supreme Court rendered a decision
in the Kelo case, they essentially decided not to ultimately
resolve the takings question, but rather to leave it to the states.
B. New Takings, Public Opinion, and State Governments
It is much too soon to properly gauge the ultimate
impact of the Kelo decision. However, certain early
observations suggest where things might be headed. Prior to
the Kelo decision, there was an increase in the number of
eminent domain claims. "According to the Institute for Justice,
more than 10,000 properties were threatened or taken by
45
eminent domain between 1998 and 2002." Based on the
Court's broader interpretation for "public use" and the number
of communities who are interested in economic development to
attract new business and expand tax revenue, the number of
takings claims is likely to rise dramatically.

Another clear early observation is that the public
generally reacted negatively to the Kelo decision and to the use
of eminent domain takings to further economic development.
According to Dana Berliner of the Institute for Justice, "Polls
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show public opposition has ranged from 70 percent to more
than 90 percent of respondents.'"'6 This would point toward
people lobbying their state legislators for laws to restrict such
takings and to fight legal claims in the area if their property is
targeted.

pollution, and traffic."51 The City entered into an agreement
with a private firm to plan economic development. The plan
called for construction of apartments and condominiums,
commercial office space and parking with substantial revenue
earmarked for the city. The firm was able to purchase most of
the affected property, but the City commenced eminent domain
proceedings against owners who refused to sell. The City
relied on a consultant's conclusion that the neighborhood was a
"deteriorating area" in danger of becoming a blighted area and
proceeded under the Norwood Code to take the property. A
state trial court upheld the taking and an appeals court denied a
stay of that judgment. The Ohio Supreme Court reversed those
lower court decisions.

Based on this overwhelming public opposition and the
Keto Court's ruling that states could choose appropriate limits
on takings connected with economic development, it seems
likely that state governments will address this issue with new
legislation. In fact, according to Larry Morandi, who tracks
eminent domain issues for the National Conference for State
Legislators, that is precisely what is happening. "Lawmakers
in 44 states have drawn up more than 320 eminent domain
bills.'"'7 Alabama, Michigan and Ohio took steps to limit or
place a moratorium on the use of eminent domain for economic
development purposes. South Dakota sought to block takings
for any private person or nongovernment entity. Pennsylvania
proposed a ban on private development takings bu the measure
would exempt Philadelphia and
for seven years.
The early state bills are very restrictive.4 Even the Federal
Government has been considering bills that would restrict the
use of federal funds to s'!fsport condemnation that "primarily
9
benefits private entities.'

C. First State Post Keto Decision: Norwood v. Horney
On July 26, 2006, the Ohio State Supreme Court became
the first state high court to decide a case involving eminent
domain issues since the Keto decision. In the case of Norwood
v. Horney, 50 a development project in Norwood Ohio gave rise
to the property owners ' challenge. Norwood was a community
near Cincinnati that had undergone changes that " ... eroded its
industrial base, diminished its financial strength, shifted its
nature from residential to commercial and increased noise,

The Ohio Supreme Court steered away from the Keto
decision and instead cited the Keto dissent and the Hathcoc/22
Michigan Supreme Court decision to use a heightened scrutiny
test in reviewing the eminent domain powers. The Court ruled
that the fact the appropriation would provide an economic
benefit to the government and community, standing alone, did
not satisfy the public use requirement of the Ohio Constitution.
Furthermore, the Court ruled that the use of "deteriorating
area" as a standard for determining whether private property is
subject to appropriation was unconstitutionally void for
vagueness. Finally, the Court ruled that that part of the City of
Norwood Code which permitted the taking and using of
appropriated property after the compensation had been
deposited but prior to appellate review was also
unconstitutional in violation of the separation of powers
doctrine. 53 This case clearly shows that the Kelo decision
potentially might not signal a change in how state courts handle
eminent domain cases.
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V. CONCLUSION
The sharply divided Supreme Court Keto decision, the
public's generally negative reaction to that decision, and
numerous states enacting new "takings" legislation are all
factors that suggest that more litigation will continue. The
Court's dramatic expansion of the interpretation of"public
use" to include "public purpose" under the Fifth Amendment's
Takings Clause in the name of economic development, and the
common "blight" problems in America's larger cities invite
such litigation. Furthermore, politicians and those in state and
local governments will have difficult decisions in navigating a
path to protect private property interests on the one hand and to
promote economically healthy cities on the other hand.
Wealthy developers and major corporations seeking
government inducements to stay in one city or to relocate to
another city will only add to the difficulty of those decisions.
The Court's decision in Keto not to use a heightened
scrutiny test in "Takings" cases involving economic
development, its announced deference to state and local
governments' decision in those cases, and its general
abdication to state governments to pass more restrictive laws in
this area has ultimately served to make a gray and cloudy area
of law even more gray and cloudy. Indeed, the new state
legislation, and likely increased litigation in numerous states
suggests we have storm clouds forming and new decisions
from the various states will be raining down on us soon.
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